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VIRGINIA SALES TAX-TECHNICAL ISSUES
AND EXPERIENCES
STUART W.

CONNOCK

Director, Sales and Use Tax Division-Department of Taxation
Richmond, Virginia

It is indeed an honor to be a part of this Tax Conference and to
discuss with you some of the technical issues and experiences in the
administration of the Virginia Retail Sales and Use Tax Act. In addition,
it gives me the privilege of participating in a conference with tax
specialists, who play an all important role in any tax program.
The annual income to be derived by the Commonwealth of Virginia
and its political subdivisions from the 3 % State Sales and Use Tax and
the 1% local Sales and Use Tax is estimated at $240.4 million for the
fiscal year 1968-69. This compares to $240.2 million in Individual
Income and Fiduciary taxes and $51 million in Corporate Income
Taxes for the same fiscal year. Therefore, you can see that Sales and
Use Taxes are an important source of revenue and contribute a proportionate share to the budget of the Commonwealth of Virginia and
its political subdivisions.
The modem State Sales and Use Tax came into being in 1932 and
by 1937 there were 21 states which had adopted general sales and use
taxes at the rate of 2% or 3% on retail sales. By 1965, Virginia was
one of only eleven states which had not adopted a general sales and use
tax, however, on March 12, 1966, Virginia, as you know, enacted
into law the present act, imposing a State sales and use tax of 2%, to
be increased to 3% July 1, 1968, and granted to the political subdivisions the authority to impose a 1% local sales tax. (A subsequent
amendment to the act by the 1968 Session of the General Assembly
authorized political subdivisions to impose a 1% local use tax.)
The sales and use tax yield is determined largely by the base of the tax
and a major factor in arriving at the tax base is the number of exemptions permitted; the smaller the exemptions the higher the base.
Not only does a limited number of exemptions increase the base, but
it decreases the cost of administration. Section 58-441.6 of the Code
of Virginia sets forth the exemptions under the act and each exemption
carries with it an administrative problem of construction and interpretation.
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The disposition of the sales and use tax revenue is made in the following manner:
1. All State Tax money collected is paid into the general fund of
the State Treasurer.
2. Prior to July 1, 1968, one-half of this money in the general
fund was distributed to the counties and cities, based on
school age population. Now, as a result of the increase in the
State rate from 2% to 3%, effective July 1, 1968, one-third
of the State money is distributed to the counties and cities
based on school age population.
3. In addition, every county or city may impose a 1% local sales
tax and after July 1, 1968, a 1 % local use tax. These collections are remitted to the Department of Taxation where they
are deposited to a special account and returned to the counties
and cities imposing the tax.
4. Therefore, one-half of the revenues collected from combined
State and local tax is used for local purposes and no charge
is made to the locality for the collection of the local tax. All
distributions to localities are made monthly.
Since each of you is a tax accountant or tax attorney, I will not endeavor to review the Sales and Use Tax Act or the Rules and Regulations, but I would like to take this opportunity to discuss certain barriers
that confront the Sales Tax Administrator.
Interstate Commerce
When one considers a state sales and use tax he instinctively, but
erroneously, believes he is considering a local problem. This is far from
the truth since many transactions involve dealings among the various
states, and a great deal of interaction among the different states. These
transactions, of course, involve interstate commerce, and as you may
know, the Federal Constitution states that "Congress shall have the
power . . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states . . .". Therefore, no state can impose a sales or
use tax which places an undue burden on interstate commerce, but what
constitutes an undue burden is a question of fact which must be resolved by examining the circumstances of each particular case.
Suppose a vendor purchases merchandise outside his state of residence and returns home with his purchase? It is apparent that states
imposing a sales tax would lose to foreign states many retail transactions
by their residents if purchases (sales) made in states not imposing
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sales taxes could not be taxed by states in which the property was used.
States, in order to prevent the loss of revenue and customers to their
retail merchants, began imposing a use tax. The use tax may be levied
on (1) the purchaser for the privilege of using the goods within the
state or (2) the vendor for the privilege of marketing his goods within
the state. The imposition of this tax has been held constitutional and
the right of a state to impose a use tax on the use of property within its
jurisdiction has been well established.
In upholding the use tax, the courts have observed that the use tax
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, but instead achieves
equality between purchases made within and without the state. The imposition of a use tax has destroyed a major advantage enjoyed by nonsales tax states.
Suppose that the state in which the vendor resides imposes a sales tax
on a transaction which involves interstate commerce, and the state of
destination imposes a use tax on the same transaction. Obviously, this
would create an undue burden and would be unconstitutional. Case
decisions have resolved this dual taxation problem, by forbidding the
vendor's state from imposing a sales tax on this interstate transaction.
In essence, what has been said up to this point is that when two
states are involved in an interstate transaction, only the state of destination may impose a tax on it.
In the above, I have attempted to show which state may levy a tax
on an interstate transaction; the following considers the question of who
may be required to collect the tax. First, let us dispose of the problem
of collecting the sales tax.
The state of destination can obviously require an out-of-state vendor
to collect a sales tax on sales made within the state by out-of-state
vendors. However, the state of destination cannot require the out-ofstate vendor to collect a sales tax on sales made without the state, even
if the out-of-state vendor delivers property within the state in his own
vehicle. Hence, unless a sale is made within the state, no sales tax
may be levied by the state of market on the transaction, however,
such an interstate transaction is subject to the use tax.
This leads us to the difficult problem of determining which out-ofstate vendors may be required to collect the use tax. The Supreme
Court has held that the use tax is not an undue burden on interstate
commerce; therefore, the out-of-state vendors have been reduced to the
single argument that the state of destination cannot require them to
collect a use tax because the state has no jurisdiction over them.
The test then is-Has an out-of-state vendor brought himself under
the state's jurisdiction by establishing sufficient contact within the state
which will bring him within the jurisdiction of the state of market?
The general rule is that the out-of-state vendor is required to collect

TAX CONFERENCE

the use tax. There are, as of this date to my knowledge, only two
Supreme Court cases where the out-of-state vendor was relieved from
collection of the use tax. The first case involved a Delaware vendor,
advertising in Delaware and making sales in Maryland as a result of
this advertising. Deliveries were made into Maryland by the Delaware
vendor. The court held that the Delaware vendor could not be required
to collect the Maryland use tax because he was not exploiting the
market by actively promoting sales and because his deliveries were
occasional rather than regular and systematic.'
The second Supreme Court case involved sales made solely by mail
order. In this case, the inducement to purchase was made solely through
the mail with no local activities or advertising within Illinois, however
the case was not decided on a contact basis, but rather that this was
a pure interstate commerce business and as such no tax could be placed

on

it.2

The two cases just referred to, represent the exception to the general
rule requiring vendors to collect the use tax.
It was held in Scripto Inc. v. Carson,8 that a foreign vendor had
sufficient contacts with the state of market simply by making sales
within the state through independent contractors. Apparently, no line
has been drawn determining what activities are sufficient to make a
vendor a use tax collector for a state in which he markets his products,
yet many feel that the mere exploitation of a state's market is sufficient
activity by a vendor to bring him within the jurisdiction of that state's
laws. Unless an out-of-state vendor engages in precisely the activities
specified in Miller Brothers or National Bellas Hess, he will be required
to collect use taxes within the state of market.
The collection of use taxes is, as I have shown, a national problem
under present case law; loop holes have developed which exclude certain
vendors from collecting the use tax and make collections of the tax highly unlikely. Of course, the state may levy the tax on the in-state consumer,
however, the impracticability of this is self-evident and needs no development. The situation now is one where some vendors are taking
advantage of "legal loop holes" to the detriment of other vendors,
especially the local vendor, as his product will be taxed, and the "legal
loop hole vendors" product will not be taxed.

'Miller Brothers Company v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340 (1954).
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U. S. 765 (1967).

2
3

Scripto Incorporated v. Carson, 362 U. S. 207 (1960).
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National Banks
On June 17, 1968, a divided United States Supreme Court held that
a federal statute of long standing (12 USC 548) bars the imposition of
state and local sales and use4 taxes on purchases of tangible personal
property by National Banks.
On its face, this ruling applies to those state and local sales tax
laws which require the tax to be collected from the purchaser. Nominally, at least, the distinctions between such a sales tax and one legally
imposed on the vendor is still recognized, however, the action of the
Supreme Court in rejecting the Massachusetts sales tax as one imposed
on the vendor, suggests the possibility that the sales tax laws of other
states which contain qualified pass-on provisions might also be construed to be vendee-type rather than vendor-type sales taxes.
Naturally the decision will have an effect on state and local sales
and use tax revenues and we estimate that the loss of revenue in Virginia as a result of this case, will be approximately $1.5 million per
year. We might say the court had no other choice than to exempt
National Banks in view of the Congressional Act imposed in 1864.
As a result of this decision, the State Tax Commissioner of Virginia
was required to hold on July 18, 1968, that National Banks and State
Banks in Virginia are exempt from Virginia sales and use taxes on
purchases and leases of tangible personal property for their own use.
(State banks were included in the exemption pursuant to Section
58-441.46 of the Code of Virginia.)
It is clear that any change in the law governing the taxation of
National Banks by the states will have to come from Congress and
that the initiative for such a change will have to come from the -states.
Shortly after this decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
Congressman Podell of New York introduced in the House of Representatives HR 19031, a bill to clarify the liability of National Banks
for sales and use taxes. The bill briefly stated that a National Bank
has no immunity from any sales or use tax which it would be required
to pay if it were a bank chartered under the laws of the state or other
jurisdiction in which its principal office is located.
This bill was not acted upon by the 90th Congress, but we can be
assured that legislation of some form will be introduced by the states
when the 91st Congress convenes in January, 1969. Both the majority
and the minority opinion in the First Agricultural National Bank case
supplied the ammunition which shows that such legislation should
be passed.
4

First Agricultural National Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Commission, 390 U. S. 1020 (1968).
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Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2nd. Circuit
held on July 10, 1968, in U. S. and Schuman v. Sullivan that the
soldiers' and sailors' Civil Relief Act prohibited the imposition of the
Connecticut sales and use taxes on purchases of tangible personal
property by non-resident servicemen present in the state solely under
military orders. Connecticut has appealed the case to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
If the Supreme Court affirms this decision, an additional situation
will be created in which persons will benefit from local government
functions and not bear their fair share of the burden. Of more concern
to the State Tax Administrators is the radical departure of the court
in its interpretation of the statute and the administrative problems that
would be encountered.
When we read the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act we find that
for taxation purposes, the states in which military personnel are located
cannot deem such personnel to be domiciled within the state or residents
of the state, and that states cannot treat the personal propery of such
personnel as having a situs there. This prohibits no state from imposing
a tax, it merely states that an income tax may be imposed only by the
state of domicile or residency and a personal property tax may be
imposed only by the state of situs of the property.
If the above statements were presented to a tax specialist, and that
specialist were asked, "What type taxes would be affected by this
law?"-he would not answer sales taxes. For neither the situs of
personal property nor the purchasers domicile or residency have any
bearing on the imposition of a sales tax. The language of the Act is
taxation language and clearly not sales tax language.
Even if one wanted to prevent the state of purchase from imposing
a sales tax he could not do so under the language of this Act. The Act
only has a bearing on "taxation in respect-his personal property."
This language cannot stop the imposition of a sales tax as the property
protected is only his personal property and the property does not
become his unitl after the purchaser has paid the sales tax or becomes
obligated to do so, and therefore, the Act comes too late.
Should the Supreme Court sustain the lower court decision the
problem among vendors as to who to charge and who not to charge
would be fantastic; servicemen would legally be required to fill out
and return a consumers use tax return to their home state on every
purchase made by them outside their home state and a great deal of
ill-will would arise between civilians and military personnel.
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Washington National Airport
One other area of inequity in tax treatment is the Washington
National Airport, which is in Virginia, yet no sales or use taxes can
be imposed there. The land upon which the terminal is built was
formerly in Arlington, Virginia, however, in 1946, this land was ceded
to the Federal Government when Congress established Virginia's
boundary line. Virginia voluntarily ceded this land, while reserving
only the right to tax fuel to be used in the over-the-road vehicles.
At that time, Virginia realized it was giving up land and foregoing
the tax revenues which that land would produce, but also it was
sympathetic to a struggling airline industry and did not insist on the
normal tax powers that the State would have in connection with independent businesses being conducted at a Federal installation or a
Federal reservation.
The situation has changed greatly in the last 22 years, yet Washington National Airport is the only Federal Reservation in the country
where independent businesses remain free of any taxes. Incidentally,
Dulles, a Federal reservation recently constructed, has no tax immunity.
There is no need to elaborate on the obvious tax discrimination against
other vendors in Virginia and against the Washington metropolitan
area as a result of this tax-free oasis.
Senator Byrd and Senator Spong introduced a bill in the 90th
Congress to permit Virginia to impose income, fuel and sales taxes on
the independent businesses located at the Washington National Airport.
Such legislation would not only provide approximately $2.5 million in
State and local sales and use taxes, due Virginia, but also, it would
eliminate the unjust discrimination against surrounding vendors.
As with all legislation, there was opposition to the bill. The airlines
operating out of the Washington National Airport were opposed to the
legislation and strong opposition was voiced by the Federal Aviation
Administration. I might add that the Federal Aviation Administrator
had a difficult time explaining why Washington National should be
tax-free and its competitor, Dulles International, subject to all Virginia
taxes.

Interstate Taxation Act
On May 23rd of this year, the House of Representatives passed the
Willis Bill (HR 2158) by a vote of 384 to 89 and the bill was referred
to the Senate Committee on Finance. The bill was reported by the
House Judiciary Committee in March, 1967, and was cleared for floor
action in July, 1967, but because of determined opposition, primarily
from states, the bill was not scheduled for debate until May, 1968.
H. R. 2158 is the product of a multi-year investigation by a special
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subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, headed by Representative Willis of Louisiana. The initial bill, introduced in October,
1965, was broader in scope, but because of heavy opposition, the
subcommittee removed provisions relating to federal performance of
administrative and judicial functions. What remained was primarily a
measure to limit the jurisdiction of the states to tax.
The Council of State Governments, the National Governors' Conference and most other organizations of state officials have repeatedly
expressed opposition to the Willis bill.
To give you some idea of the damaging effects of this bill as far
as sales and use taxes are concerned, if ever enacted into law by
Congress, H. R. 2158 would exempt certain multi-state business firms
from state and local taxation in many of the jurisdictions where they
would operate, and would reduce materially the state and local tax
liabilities of many other firms. This would be done by establishing
narrower jurisdictional standards for state and local taxation than
those now permitted. In order to require that a seller collect a sales
or use tax, the state or local government would have to find either
physical property or at least one full-time employee within its territory.
In the case of inventories, only that property which was actually in
the name of the taxpayer would be counted. Under such rules, a
variety of legal devices could be utilized to insulate a multi-state
business from taxation.
Advertised as a bill to relieve small taxpayers ,the bill contains a
variety of provisions to prohibit a state or local government from engaging in certain practices relating to sales and use taxes, taxation of
household goods and out-of-state audit charges which virtually all states
already have abolished. The bill takes no account of changes in taxing
practices made since the Willis subcommittee completed its study more
than three years ago.
Title One, declares that a seller must have a "business location" in a
state or political subdivision in order for the jurisdiction to have power
to require that a sales or use tax be collected. A business location exists
when a person owns or leases real property or has at least one employee
or regularly maintains a stock of tangible personal property in the state
for sale in the ordinary course of its business.
These provisions open the door to devices enabling the seller to avoid
being taxed or required to collect sales and use taxes, such as using
brokers or independent contractors as salesmen; shifting employees
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; accepting orders out-of-state; warehousing goods not in one's name and dealing through independent
corporations.
Title Three, specifies that a sales tax may be imposed or a seller be
required to collect a sales tax by a state only if the destination of the
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sale is in the state or the seller regularly makes household deliveries in
the state. It has been claimed that this is an extension of state jurisdiction, but states have this jurisdiction already.
Another provision would relieve a seller from collecting a sales tax
if the purchaser furnishes a registration number of the state. This would
make it necessary for the state to collect the tax from the buyer resulting in a tremendous decrease in sales tax collections.
The basic fault of H. R. 2158 is that it would deny state and local
governments essential control over their own revenue-raising capacities.
These governments are already hard pressed to meet the ever-increasing
cost of providing necessary state and local services.
Proponents of the legislation have claimed that state and local tax
systems are complex, incapable of collecting more than a minimum
of the tax liability claimed, and burdensome for the taxpayers who must
comply with them. But this legislation would not appear to meet these
problems. It would give preferential relief to some taxpayers by exempting them from taxation or by limiting their tax liability. In so,
doing, it would shift the burden to others. Local retailers, owners of
residential and farm properties, businesses with large, immovable assets
in a particular community, even individual non-property taxpayers
would probably receive larger state and local tax bills to make up for
the losses.
Because Congress adjourned, no action was taken by the Senate
Finance Committee but prior to adjournment, Senator Ribicoff of
Connecticut stated to the Senate on October 14th, that it is regrettable
that the 90th Congress was adjourning without final action on legislation
to provide some uniformity in application of scores of state and local
tax laws affecting interstate commerce business.
Senator Ribicoff went on to say that he was making available a new
draft of the bill to include two additional amendments for consideration
before the 91st Congress convenes in January. He urged the Committee
on Finance to schedule consideration of this important legislation as
early as possible in 1969 as a priority matter. Needless to say, the
bill has the support of many major national associations, but I must say
that we believe such legislation would be detrimental to the states, provide a real loss of revenue, penalize the in-state dealer by placing him
at an unfair competitive disadvantage and create areas of doubt in sales
in interstate commerce.
In conclusion, I must submit that there are many grey areas in sales
and use taxation that we have to resolve in the years to come, but
nowhere do we find greater problems than those which I have mentioned being created by court decisions and adverse legislation.
May I thank you for your attention and for letting me be with
you this afternoon.

